LESSONS TO LEARN: THE WEAKNESS OF TALIBAN MARKSMANSHIP

From http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/the-weakness-of-taliban-marksmanship/?scp=2&sq=Taliban&st=cse#


NOTE: If you have few arms, little to no manufacturing capacity and a limited amount of ammunition then making certain EVERY ROUND COUNTS is essential.

The Taliban fighting Americans have heart and vast stockpiles of rusty, shoddy small arms and ammunition, and nothing else. They oppress their women and want to stay in the middle ages. The Mujahedeen who fought the Soviets with accurate bolt action Mausers and Lee-Enfield rifles and good marksmanship have bowed out of the war-Thank God every day for that for if the US Government really did something stupid... they've done alot but if those 50-60 year old men get pissed off at us the war will get a LOT WORSE.

Americans on paper know how to shoot, but their small arms are optimized for close in combat as in Iraq. Our troops on paper believe in Freedom but the beast wants to impose a democratic tyranny like we have in the USA on Afghanistan. In a recent article I posted that has turned out to be a clusterfuck. Being corrupt themselves they shortcut-hence the keystone kops writ large Afghan National Police.

Lessons for Americans?

Know how to shoot. The Appleseed Program is a good start-just lie about your identity, carpool so you're not profiled by the fed operatives wanting to know who's motivated to shoot. And avoid having anything to do with "fred". At any rate the Marine Corp manuals on individual marksmanship and squad rifle teams will carry you until you can acquire more potent sniper rifles and true snipers-able to make consistent 1st round hits past 600 yards.

Look HERE:

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/18341332/USMC-Rifle-Marksmanship

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/18336209/Technique-of-fire-of-the-rifle-squad

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/18327306/Talking-target-pdf

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/18317919/Police-Accuracy

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/18314979/Marksmanship-coaches-guide

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/17212871/Marine-Rifle-Squad

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/17210307/How-To-Beat-SWAT-Teams

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/17210301/How-David-Beats-Goliath


Study the Taliban for their use of heavy weapons that outrange the urban optimized M-4's used by our overweighted troops. Substitute accurate individual and team rifle fire.

And although much of America is urban, much isn't. Even in the urbanized areas there are areas where you can use long range rifle fire.

The article: learn!


The Weakness of Taliban Marksmanship
By C.J. CHIVERS
Reuters Taliban fighters training in Afghanistan in 2009.

Last week, At War opened a conversation about Afghan marksmanship by publishing rough data from several dozen recent firefights between the Taliban and three Marine rifle companies in and near Marja, the location of the recent offensive in Helmand Province. The data showed that while the Taliban can be canny and brave in combat their rifle fire is often remarkably ineffective.
We plan more posts about the nature of the fighting in Afghanistan, and how this influences the experience of the war. Today this blog discusses visible factors that, individually and together, predict poor shooting results when Taliban gunmen get behind their rifles.
It’s worth noting that many survivors of multiple small-arms engagements in Afghanistan have had experiences similar to those described last week. After emerging unscathed from ambushes, including ambushes within ranges at which the Taliban’s AK-47 knock-offs should have been effective, they wonder: how did so much Taliban fire miss?
Many factors are at play. Some of you jumped ahead and submitted comments that would fit neatly on the list; thank you for the insights. Our list includes these: limited Taliban knowledge of marksmanship fundamentals, a frequent reliance on automatic fire from assault rifles, the poor condition of many of those rifles, old and mismatched ammunition that is also in poor condition, widespread eye problems and uncorrected vision, and the difficulties faced by a scattered force in organizing quality training.
There are other factors, too. But this is enough for now. Already it’s a big list.
For those who face the Taliban on patrol, the size and complexity of this list can be read as good news, because when it comes to rifle fighting, the Taliban – absent major shifts in training, equipment and logistics – are likely to remain mediocre or worse at one of the central skills of modern war. And the chance of any individual American or Afghan soldier being shot will remain very small. The flip side is that parts of the list can also be read as bad news for Western military units, because Afghan army and police ranks are dense with non-shooters, too.

Limited Appreciation of Marksmanship Fundamentals
Let’s dispense outright with talk of born marksmen. Although some people are inclined to be better shots than others, and have a knack, marksmanship itself is not a natural trait. It is an acquired skill. It requires instruction and practice. Coaching helps, too. Combat marksmanship further requires calm. Yes, the combined powers of clear vision, coordination, fitness, patience, concentration and self-discipline all play roles in how a shooter’s skill develop. So do motivation and resolve. But even a shooter with natural gifts and strong urges to fight can’t be expected to be consistently effective with a rifle with iron sights at common Afghan engagement ranges (say, 200 yards or more, often much more) without mastering the basics. These include sight picture, sight adjustment, trigger control, breathing, the use of a sling and various shooting positions that improve accuracy. (For those of you in the gun-fighting business, forgive this discussion; many readers here do not know what you know.)
Related skills are also important, the more so in Afghanistan, where distances between combatants can be long and strong winds common, especially by day, when most Taliban shooting occurs. These skills include an ability to estimate range, to account for wind as distances stretch out and a sense of how to lead moving targets — a running man, a fast-moving vehicle, a helicopter moving low over the ground. And there are many more.
We noted last week that our discussions about Taliban marksmanship rely on what can be seen and heard of incoming fire; this is because we don’t embed with the Taliban. Without being beside Taliban fighters in a firefight or attending their training classes, it can be hard to say exactly what mistakes they are making when they repeatedly miss what would seem to be easy shots, such as Marines and Afghan soldiers upright in the open at 150 yards. Two things are clear enough. First, for combatants who become expert shots, the skills that make up accurate shooting have formed into habits. Second, many Afghan insurgents do not possess the full set of these skills. This is demonstrated by the results, but also by a behavior easy to detect in firefights: they often fire an automatic, which leads to the next point.
A Frequent Reliance on Automatic Fire
Few sounds are as distinctive as those made by Kalashnikov rounds passing high overhead. The previous sentence is written that way – rounds and overhead – for a reason, because this is a common way that incoming Kalashnikov fire is heard in Afghanistan: in bursts, and high. Over and over again in ambushes and firefights, the Taliban’s gunmen fire their AK-47 knockoffs on automatic mode. The Kalashnikov series already suffers from inherent range and accuracy limitations related to its medium-power cartridges, its relatively short barrel, the short space between its rear and front sights, and the heavy mass and deliberately loose fit of the integrated bolt carrier and gas piston traveling within the receiver.
For many shooters, the limitations resulting from these design characteristics are manageable at shorter ranges and with disciplined shooting. In certain environments and conditions, including in dense vegetation where typical skirmish distances shrink, the limitations are easily overcome. Add distance between a shooter and a target, and fire a Kalashnikov on automatic, and the rifle’s weaknesses can emerge starkly. There are reasons for this. One is perceptible to people who are shot at but not struck. When fired on automatic, the weapon’s muzzle rises. Bullets start to climb. At very short ranges, a round from a climbing muzzle might still hit a man. At longer ranges, which are common in arid Afghanistan, the chances of a hit decline sharply. Rounds travel over heads.
For decades, those who have trained Afghan fighters have cajoled, preached and drilled the importance of firing on semiautomatic mode (read: one shot for each trigger pull) for most situations. A Marine lieutenant colonel I served with in the 1980s and 1990s had been previously assigned to Pakistan to train anti-Soviet mujahedeen. His accounts of Afghan and foreign fighters who were impervious to instruction on the importance of single-shot fire would seem to describe many insurgents in the field in Afghanistan today.
Poor Condition of Rifles
While Taliban fighters commonly use Kalashnikov rifles, other firearms are in the mix, including PK machine guns and sometimes Lee-Enfield rifles. After one skirmish in Marja, Kilo Company, Third Battalion, Sixth Marines captured a single-shot 12-gauge shotgun with a collapsible stock and an assortment of buckshot rounds, in addition to two Kalashnikovs. The shotgun was notable not just because it was a battlefield novelty, but also because it was in excellent condition.

The weapons captured by Kilo Company were of types well regarded for reliability. But reliability and accuracy are different things, and these rifles pointed to another factor influencing Taliban marksmanship. Look below at two weapons that the company’s First Platoon collected during a long, rolling gunfight on another day. Their condition assured that they could not be fired with optimal accuracy.
C.J. Chivers
The problem with the first rifle is easy to spot: it is missing its wooden stock. While this makes the weapon more readily concealable, it also makes it almost impossible for a shooter to hold steady while firing. A shooter who tried firing that rifle from his right shoulder would probably reconsider quickly, as the exposed and pointed base of the receiver would bruise his shoulder muscle. One likely way to fire this weapon would be to hold it away from the body while pulling the trigger.
C.J. Chivers
That is not a preferred shooting position. At short ranges this rifle could still be nasty. It is more than ready for crime. But for a complex firefight at typical ranges against a conventional Western infantry unit? Beyond providing suppressive fire and making noise, it would not be of much use.
The problem with the second rifle is more subtle but still obvious – one of the original screws that affixed the wooden stock to the rifle’s receiver is missing. Its absence allows for wobble. Wobble assures inaccuracy.
Mismatched, Old or Corroding Ammunition
A post here in January discussed the mixed sources of Taliban rifle ammunition evident in captured rifle magazines.
In February, Kilo Company captured several Taliban chest rigs, which together held many more Kalashnikov magazines. The company allowed an inventory of all of this ammunition and an examination of its condition and head stamps, which usually tell where and when a round was manufactured. The inventory showed that Taliban magazines contained a hodgepodge of old ammunition and rounds of mixed provenance, along with ammunition identical to what had been issued to Afghan government forces.


The post in January noted that this blog would discuss how mixed ammunition might undermine accuracy. Here’s the short course. Rifle cartridges that appear to be identical but are made in different factories, nations and decades can have different characteristics that affect a bullet’s flight. Different propellants, for example, change muzzle velocities and therefore change a bullet’s trajectory. Moreover, as ammunition ages, it can degrade, especially when exposed to moisture over time and to extremes in temperature. Over many years, the effects of heat cycling – the ups and downs of ammunition temperatures between night and day, and the more extreme temperature swings between winter and summer – accelerate decay and can undermine consistent ballistic performance. And when ballistic performance becomes inconsistent, bullets aimed and fired in exactly the same way do not end up in the same places.
Units that are serious about marksmanship take their ammunition seriously. They train and adjust the sights of their rifles with the same ammunition they carry in combat. They try to store ammunition in ways that keep it clean, dry, and, if not at a stable temperature, at least within a narrower temperature swing.
The ammunition carried by Taliban fighters in Marja showed a wide range of ages and points of manufacture. Sometimes a single magazine would have more than 10 different sources. Many rounds were filthy. Others were corroded. This is not a recipe for accuracy.
Poor and Uncorrected Vision
Next on the list was a matter of public health. Many Afghans suffer from uncorrected vision problems, which have roots in factors ranging from poor childhood nutrition to the scarcity of medical care. One reader submitted a comment as thought-provoking on this theme as anything we might type. The blog defers to the reader, “Rosenkranz, Boston.”
A substantial percentage of individuals worldwide suffer from myopia, which probably is the case among the Taliban as well; in general, the developing world has limited or nonexistent prescription eyewear use, and I think it’s generous to consider Afghanistan “developing.” I doubt the Taliban’s health care coverage, such as it is, has a very generous prescription policy. Additionally, the high altitude of Afghanistan increases the likelihood of cataracts due to increased ultraviolet exposure and again, there are probably limited cataract extractions, Ray-ban or Oakley options as well. Lacking extant shopping malls replete with optical shops and sunglass kiosks, and often squinting, half-blind, and sun burned, it’s amazing that the Taliban do as well as they do.
Thank you, “Rosencranz.”
Using the iron sights on an infantry rifle requires a mix of vision-related tasks. A shooter must be able to discern both the rifle’s rear and front sights (directly in front of the shooter’s face) and also see the target (as far as several hundred yards off). Then the former must be aligned with the latter. This is difficult in ideal circumstances for lightly trained gunmen; for some people with bad vision, it might be almost impossible. Over the years many officers and noncommissioned officers who train Afghan police and soldiers have said that a significant number of Afghan recruits struggle because of their eyesight. The Taliban recruit their fighters from the same population; poor vision can be expected to be a factor in their poor riflery.
The Difficulties of Organizing Training
The Taliban are a far-flung organization, and operate in decentralized fashion. As Afghan and Western troop levels have risen, and as more drones and aircraft have been flying overhead, insurgents have effectively blended into the civilian population. The shift from being an open presence to being an underground force has consequences. The old training camps in Afghanistan long ago disappeared; as a result, opportunities to provide formal instruction to new fighters are not what they were. The Taliban claim to run camps still. That may be so. Their camps are unlikely to be as robust as the network that existed through mid-2001. Areas of Pakistan also provide training sites, but again, the drone presence makes this more difficult than before. And without ample opportunities to train, the Taliban’s rank-and-file cannot be expected to master marksmanship. It is true that war can sharpen the fighting skills of surviving combatants, and so it is likely that among the Taliban there is a core of veteran and more effective fighters. But it is also true that as a combat force is pressured, attrition constantly steals its talent. Over time, without fresh recruits who have undergone sufficient training, a fighting force’s skills, as a whole, diminish. In a long war, it is not enough just to hand out ammunition and guns. History is full of examples.
Fighting on Taliban Terms
Nothing discussed above is necessarily surprising if the Taliban are considered in context. They are an insurgent force, not a conventional outfit supported by the resources of a Western government and economy. Their state of equipment and readiness are naturally lower than those of their Western foes.
Can the Taliban correct all of the problems contributing to their poor marksmanship? To do so, they would have to develop a marksmanship curriculum and the training to support it. They would have to examine their rifles and repair or replace many of them. Ammunition would have to be standardized, and eyesight problems diagnosed and treated. These ambitions have proved hard to achieve in the Afghan National Army and for the Afghan police, both of which have been supported for nearly a decade by the Pentagon. There is little reason to expect any of it to happen. Taliban rifle shooting will almost certainly stay bad.
What does this mean? The previous post ended with a quote about poor Taliban marksmanship from Capt. Stephan P. Karabin II, who commands Charlie Company, First Battalion, Third Marines. This post will wind down with the help of one of his fellow company commanders, Capt. Thomas Grace, of the battalion’s Bravo Company. Captain Grace sent an insightful e-mail here over the weekend. His note summarized many things.
First, a fuller look at his Marines’ experience with Taliban rifle fire.
[Bravo Company] has participated in over 200 patrols and been in countless engagements over the course of six months with actual boots on the ground. We have been in over a dozen actual Troop-In-Contact (TICs) warranting Close Air Support (CAS) and priority of assets because of the severity of the contact or pending contact. The only weapons systems the insurgents were effective with were machine guns, and only at suppressing our movement. We only had one instance where Marines reported single shots (possibly a “sniper” or insurgent with a long-range rifle) being effective as suppression. [Bravo Company] had no Marines struck by machine-gun or small-arms rounds, some really close calls but no hits.
Later, Captain Grace discussed how the Taliban, in spite of such unmistakably poor marksmanship skills, adapted and managed to be a relevant fighting force, and have at times elevated shoddy shooting from harassing fire into part of a complicated and lethal form of trap. Afghans who might not be able to settle into a gunfight against a patrol with superior equipment and training have learned to herd Western forces toward hidden bombs, which the military calls improvised explosive devices, or I.E.D.s.
We operated the entire deployment, on every patrol, in the horns of a dilemma. Insurgent forces would engage our forces from a distance with machine-gun fire and sporadic small arms and carefully watch our immediate actions. From day one, at the sound of the sonic pop of the round, Marines are taught to seek immediate cover and identify the source/location of the fire. Cover is almost always available in Afghanistan in the form or dirt berms, dry/filled canals and buildings. Marines tend to gravitate toward the aforementioned terrain features. So what the insurgents would do was booby-trap those areas with I.E.D.s. Whether they were pressure plates or pressure release, they were primed to detonate as Marines dove for cover. Back to the horns of a dilemma. Do I jump for the nearest cover? Run to the nearest building? Jump in the nearest canal? Do I take my chances and stand where I am and drop in place? Not necessarily the things you need to be contemplating as rounds are impacting all around you.
Three of Bravo Company’s Marines were killed, on three separate patrols, as a result of this tactic. The captain’s descriptions, and those deaths, carry an implicit message. Just because a man can’t shoot well, does not mean he is stupid or unable to fight. Western forces might be fighting an enemy with run-down equipment and comparatively primitive conventional skills. But they are fighting people, like themselves, men who think and adjust, and who can force a fight to be fought on their terms.
Again, Captain Grace:
There is no textbook countermeasure against this tactic, only constant attention to your surroundings — up, down, left and right — and over time realizing historical areas of contact and thinking about things from the enemies’ perspective.
That returns this post to its context. For the Taliban, bad shooting sometimes has proved to be good enough. For all of their shortcomings, the Taliban’s level of training and state of equipment have thus far been more than sufficient for waging a patient, low-intensity war for years, and for fighting Afghan government forces, which exhibit similar skill deficiencies. They are also more than capable of exerting influence over the Afghan civilian population, which for an insurgent is a large part of the war.
If you’ve made it this far, you deserve a fresh cup of coffee. Go get one. Check back later. It’s not just the Taliban who struggle to shoot straight. Next, At War will look at the poor shooting skills of the Afghan government troops, and provide an example of wild American rifle fire, too.
COMMENTS

Conversely I have read in recent articles/correspondence by GI's and reporters that the insurgent markmenship, especially in the mountains is increasingly taking a turn towards more lethal accuracy due increased encounters with long rifles such as 7.54 M91 Moison Nagants(ancient Russian infantry rifle) like the one in the leading photo, and the more modern scoped semi-auto Drangonov's and Romak's, allowing the antagonists to accurately fire at distance, and then run to escape detection and site-in. It is my understanding that the 7.54 is an excellent heavy round and when used in a clean long barreled rifle like the M91 can extreamly be accurate. Hopefully these are isolated instances and not a growing trend.


The basic reason the Taliban are not hitting single point targets at range is simple, and not even mentioned here. The AK47 is not designed for accuracy against them. It is a rip-off of the German MP44 of WWII, designed to "pray and spray" against massed bulk targets -- like the human wave Soviet assaults the Germans experienced repeatedly on the Russian Front, which the standard German infantry rifle of the time, the K98, had too slow a rate of fire to cope with. The Taliban are generally forced, because of American technical superiority, to engage Coalition targets well beyond the effective accurate range of the AK47, dictated by the sloppy, mass-production characteristics which give it its robustness under poor maintenance conditions. It's not a marksmanship issue; it's a weapons characteristic issue, period. Give the Taliban sniper rifles with properly zeroed scopes, and then write another dumb*** article on their marksmanship.


Thank you for your comment, Khiva.
A large part of this post is dedicated to the inherent inaccuracies of the Kalashnikov assault rifle line at longer ranges, and the post describes some of the technical reasons for this.



One other explanation about how a historically great group of rifle men became "pray and sprayers" is hunting.

Many of America's famous sharpshooters acquired their skills by hunting small game for food. IE, Audi Murphy, Sgt. York, even Luke Skywalker (yes I know he is fictional) bragged about hitting wombats in his speeder. When America was more rural, young boys and men often hunted small animals for the food pot. And since bullets cost money, they had to be accurate or be hungry.

Before the thirty years of war, it is possible that Afghan youth hunting for rabbits with small muzzle loaders or single shot civilian arms, would develop into great shots. But during a war, young boys cannot go out with a firearm to hunt rabbits, and so never figure out how to shoot accurately.

Keep in mind that in the US around the beginning of the twentieth century, increasing urbanization caused many groups/people such as the forerunner to the NRA, Teddy Roosevelt, the Civilian Marksmanship Program, to step up firearms instruction to improve riflery after the Spanish American war.

When I was still in Middle School on LI back in the 1980s, we still had a rifle club that shoot at the local elementary school range built under the gym. That club was the remnant of the effort to make Americans better shots.


Mr. Chivers mentioned the loose tolerances of the AK-47 in the article. If they won't look down the sights, it doesn't matter how well zeroed the weapon is.



In the NYT reporting on Marja, embedded reporters stated that there were foreign fighters in the town. Chechen mujahideen have long been a component of these foreign participants. Against the Russians, Chechen snipers were known for their marksmanship; in particular, head shots. Some of our Marines have been hit by single shots in the neck or otherwise above their ceramic plate armor. It is not just indigenous Taliban who are shooting at our troops.

Blaming hardware, the AK-47, as a factor in Taliban inaccuracy isn't wise. First, many of them are shooting captured Russian rifles whose bores are still good. Remember that the VC and NVA were armed with Russian and Chinese AK-47 and employed them effectively. Some of our troops valued the AK-47 for its reliability. Select single shot and you can hit your target. The M4/M16 is not accurate on full-auto unless you know how to lean into it. Most Marine M4 selector switches have a 3 round burst position on their selector switch in lieu of full-auto for this reason and to conserve ammo. Secondly, if you watch pictures of the Taliban shooting; they are giving new meaning to spray and pray. Often they crouch behind a berm and hold the weapon above their heads and fire one-handed. They are not all courageous. Then watch our Marines laying down fire in response. There is good reason to stay below the rim of the berm.

The Taliban are shown training in videos using the weapon correctly, but that seems to fall apart in combat. This is likely true for the ANA as well. The IED, the heavy machine gun, and the sniper remain the principal threats to our deployed forces. Our own snipers and designated marksman are the best medicine for Taliban snipers; although in RVN, I did see Marines using recoiless rifles as counter-sniper weapons. The Marines around Marja seemed to find most of the IEDs, but they are still the guerrilla's most effective weapon against troops and vehicles.


Hey CJ,
Thanks, a lot; really.

Let's tell the bad guys what they're doing wrong AND give them some good pointers on how to correct their battlefield deficiencies.
Even better, you put it on line, so the Taliban can use the net to fine tune their tactics and attacks against American and allied forces.

What are youthinking about? What is the Times thinking about by publishing this?

Again, thanks a lot, we need more brilliant tactical analysis such as yours.
So does ths Taliban. (Sheesh)



I wonder how much of this inaccuracy is because of an actual aversion to killing. In "On Killing" by Dave Grossman he says that prior to modern training techniques (e.g. WWI, WWII) officers estimated very few (< 20 percent) of soldiers in contact actually fired their weapons, and of those that did, few would actually aim to hit.

Let's hope that poor accuracy stays the norm.


Why, oh why would you want to pubish this article for general mass consumption? Assuming your points are valid ( I do), this article, in the hands of an intelligent enemy (they are), can only serve to increase the accuracy of those we are wishing to kill. Can we assume a copy of this could be translated and given to Afgan ememies ( we should). Then I ask again, why oh why publish this article. Charles Stone, MD, Fellow of the American College of Surgeons. Former Lt. Commander Of BSSG 4 Division 2, Marine Corps, Desert Shield/Desert Storm


@A Thinker,

Saying, "Hey, you need to shoot better!" isn't exactly the key piece of information they've been missing--they likely know that already. And since they're not going to fix their eyesight by reading about their eyesight, secure a supply of steady, high quality ammunition by reading about how their ammunition sucks, or take away the drones to create more permanent training camps because they read about how drone don't allow them much more permanent training, I don't see what the big deal is.

Besides, there's something you should remember: THEY'RE NOT STUPID. That's something that he pointed out in the article, which I was very happy to see. They've already been shifting their strategy to compensate for their crappy aim, and they seem to be largely using the bullets to drive US forces into waiting traps and maybe, occasionally, hit someone with them. The fact that they're able to maintain some level of effectiveness despite their shortcomings implies that they have guys who are capable of pretty sharp analysis themselves.

@Khiva,

None you mentioned in your comment explains why, GIVEN an AK-47, they still use them in the least accurate manner. As he said, even within ranges where the AK-47 would be effective, they don't use them in an effective way. He specifically mentioned the range difference and that he weapons don't work well at long engagement ranges. But he ALSO specifically mentioned that they don't use them in semiautomatic mode, and US troops constantly hear the bullets whizzing by overhead. Moreover, he said "they repeatedly miss what would seem to be easy shots, such as Marines and Afghan soldiers upright in the open at 150 yards." Which would imply that, since they're often choosing the time and place of engagement, they SHOULD have the ability to get a few disciplined shots off while they have the element of surprise. They don't. I don't think that pointing that out is "dumbass" at all, nor is wondering why.



Weak marksmanship or not rest assured the Taliban and Afghans can and will fight to the death.


To Aaron Boston. The point is one of teaching semi automatic fire in the training camps , which could easily be done and would increase our casualities. If only on this point, they took decisive action, that could be a very significant endagerment to our troops.


Interesting. During WW-2 our airborne troops on patrol would never go for cover or stay in place but would quickly rush any attacking force counting on fear and the resulting poor marksmanship of their adversaries; not being elite troops in most cases, to gain the advantage and quickly force them to retreat or face annihilation. Of course in most cases the paratroopers were not facing prepared ambushes, but even facing dug in troops immediate almost reflexive frontal and flanking assaults proved to be very effective because it would mentally unhinge the adversary. No doubt our commanders should mix up their responses to Taliban attacks. If they encounter Taliban on our terms our troops should be more aggressive using rapid assaults to close and overwhelm the enemy and then destroy their retreat with accurate fire. If we encounter the Taliban on their terms we should vary our response from digging in ( a system can be set up where some soldiers dig while others shot suppressing fire, and digging just enough so they feel less exposed), or getting prone, to retreating and regrouping rather than taking cover in places the Taliban can predict and mine.


To Charles Bristol,

I appreciate the response, but I seriously doubt that they don't know that they should fire in semi-automatic mode for more accuracy. Again, they're not stupid. Our forces teach this widely to the Afghan army (with varying degrees of success), so it's not exactly a state secret. Moreover, it's basic information that they could find on the internet. If you know how firearms work, you know that firing in automatic mode will tend to push the muzzle upward and make you less accurate.

And that was my basic point. This guy isn't sitting here spilling state secrets like "A Thinker" pretty much accused him. This is information that I'm positive they already know, but just have a hard time drilling into their ground forces. Firing a gun well is one of those things you have to really train at. As one of the other commentators mentioned, they even show correct usage in their training videos but they still don't do this in the field.


maybe its not really in their hearts to kill.
after all, they are Muslims.
only Americans, worldwide, love precision.
others prefer shadows and light possibly unconvinced that there is so much method to war.


Although charging an ambush in the jungle or a built-up area is the approved technique, it should not be employed when your troops must cover more than 25 yards of open ground to close with the enemy. The ideal response is to employ mortars quickly (60mm without baseplate and bipod) to kill the enemy or at least keep there heads way down. Meanwhile, units with snipers should have them deployed in overwatch to provide covering fire for our troops in the open. Snipers can also kill machinegun crews at range. Marines are very aggressive and are often unwilling to wait for supporting fires before closing with the enemy. Part of this aggressive ethos is due to what has been required to succeed in beach landings. With the current rules of engagement (ROE) our forces may be denied supporting fires from other than their own organic weapons and be forced to achieve by fire and maneuver what otherwise could be achieved by artillery and air support. In media commentaries it is too often forgotten that artillery is "The King of Battle" and, in the past, has accounted for the overwhelming majority of enemy casualties. Without artillery, we are likely going to come to the point where we realize that the new ROE are too costly to our troops.


History tells us that the Afghans rid themselves of invaders by making their stay too costly. They have had no problem killing Englishmen and Russians in modern times and we too are perceived as invaders by the Taliban and many skeptical Afghans. However, we initially won (before Bush blew it) through impressive airpower accuracy and the Taliban's unwillingness to engage in pitched battles with the Northern Alliance. Some were bought off, some were persuaded, and some just retreated. It was the foreign fighters that formed the core of any significant resistance. As long as we don't commit any more Operation Anaconda or Tora Bora blunders (by higher headquarters) we should prevail on the battlefield. We can shoot straight, but can we build a nation with a corrupt and morally bankrupt central government?



The MN91/30 in the photo has an extra non-MN barrel band riding behind the front sight. What do you think?
- the cleaning rod lost its thread; a tie-down to keep it from sliding out
- new way to damp out barrel harmonic


In response to the poster who mentioned the Mosins: The caliber is 7.62 x 54R. Thats a 7.62mm (.30 cal) bullet with a 54mm rimmed case. The 91 stands for 1891, when it was designed. This design was made by the Russians in some form (M91/30, M38, M44) or another through WWII. After that the Chinese and other Soviet contries made them for decades. Many US GI's saw them in the hands of the VC in Vietnam. They are cheaper and possibly more common that the AK-47. And since that caliber is still in front line service with the Russians, ammo is available. Speaking from experiance, yes they can be as accurate as the shooter. They are very slow to fire, being a 5 round capacity bolt action. All of the marksmanship which the Taliban seems to have a hard time with would still be factors here, and they would not have the "spray and pray" option that the AK offers.



RCRogers3:

Our Airborne troops in WWII charged across open fields in Europe as a tactic against against Germans with rifles and automatic weapons. I believe the special forces now employ a similar tactic when they are engaged by superior numbers. It involves a reflex type assault with a huge burst of automatic weapons. If Marines employ similar tactics it is because all assault type troops know they are safest when they are mobile and attacking in many situations. If Airborne troops could use this tactic against trained German soldiers with accurate rifles it could be used against Taliban militia. The real issue is U.S. troops would be more at risk from Taliban with rifles on auto closer in but U.S. troops should still prevail in closer shot out because of superior auto fire training. Would the advantage be worth the extra casualties? In the long term yes because the best way to counter insurgents is not to do predictable things on any level over the long term.

In the Pacific the Japanese used a similar reflex assault tactic on patrol and suffered high casualties because U.S. troops would set up machine gun ambushes initiated by rifle fire to lure the charging Japanese in. So such a tactic should just be one of many that a commander can call on and not be used all the time.

I agree with you about Motors. The only issue that need to be dealt with is the huge amount of supply and protective gear our troops now have to hump around with. Since so few of our troops are getting injured from rifle fire they should be allowed to travel with reduced amour and perhaps even no helmets, and transfer some of that weight to mortar rounds and tubes and extra sniper rifles etc.



There are many Afghans that can shoot accurately for the same reason stated above, survival hunting. The Taliban is not in general made up of these individuals today (thankfully for our grunts and jar-heads). As far as accuracy the AK is accurate enough in the hands of a trained individual but let us hope that there are not to many Nagants laying around as they are accurate and in the hands of a subsistence hunter... deadly



This article is completely contradicted by a report by certain major Ehrhart, which states that american infantry lacks training and arms suitable for firefight in Afghan terrain. Thus in most of the engagements Taliban outguns westerners due to being on a higher ground and engaging with weapons(ak-47, mostly) that have an effective range longer than M-4. The only recourse available to pinned down GIs is to call artillery or air support.



A reference to Special Forces (SF) was inaccurate. After saying that it depends upon the situation (the school solution) it is important to note that SF operates in small teams as do most SOF with the exception of Ranger units and special operations Marines who can operate as a battalion if necessary. Having said that, when SF unexpectedly encounter a numerically superior force, we break contact using fire and maneuver - we unass the area. Then, from cover (preferably) we call in fires on the enemy. That's what 6 to 13 (AF controller attached) men do when seriously outnumbered. Of course, in an ambush, you do not necessarily know how many enemy you have engaged.

But this is a discussion of marksmanship and the weapons that the Taliban use. The effectiveness of this combination can depend upon the terrain in which the fighting takes place. In Marja and soon, Kandahar, we see a combination of open fields and built-up areas with homes and businesses. In Kandahar Province there are almost one-million people with three-hundred thousand in the city of Kandahar. There are two other cities approaching fifty-thousand each. So this is far different from the rural district of Marja. In Kandahar's cities, spray and pray will be far more dangerous - if only because of the ricochets. The ranges of engagement will be suited to the rifles of both sides and the use of supporting arms in the built-up areas will be severely restricted. In these cities, we will be doing WWII European fighting without the destruction of supporting arms. This will not be Fallujah in Iraq and, therefore, it will be a slow light infantry operation - if we follow GEN McChrystal's ROE. The Taliban and foreign fighters will have memorized these ROE. They will want us to destroy these cities and will employ IEDs and suicide bombers to inflict casualties and demoralize our troops. There are many key terrain features where snipers can hide and canalized troops can be hit with spray and pray shooting. This is AK-47 and M4 terrain. Out in the Province, it will be much the same as Marja. I fear that poor marksmanship in the built-up areas will no longer be a talisman.



1. Removing the stock and using a sling as shown in your photos allows the weapon to be fired and handed from the back of a motorcycle.

2. A lack of modern and standardized ammunition for rifles plus the lack of anti-aircraft weapons would suggest that Pakistan and Iran are not heavily arming the Taliban at this time.

3. Another recent article said that Italian police substantially improved Afghan police recruit firing accuracy by the simple act of sighting in their weapons for them, which the US contractors were remiss in doing. .... I wonder what offering them a pair of glasses would do?


Having been a Marine 0311 and having served in Iraq with a line company, training is everything. I have spent a lot of time with the m16a2 rifle and was even trained as a marksmanship coach to train other marines within my unit. The fundamentals of marksmanship are drilled into you as a recruit and they are talked about and practiced constantly as a Marine. I remember shooting at man sized targets from 500 yards away and having to make adjustments to my weapons sights just by knowing the distance to target and reading the wind. I also remember having a supreme sense of confidence about the task as I had been trained many times to do it, it becomes a responsive skill to the situation. The US government put a lot of effort into teaching me those skills.

The taliban has heart, the marines have that and superior training. Firing on full auto defies logic and common sense as a rifleman (although it does have a time and place in an infantryman's repertoire). Taliban fighters are assigned with more emphasis regarding their ideological views about their beliefs as opposed to fighting skills.

I believe those fabled afghan marksman are really out their. I also believe, as capable soldiers, they understand that if they take up arms against Marines their days on earth are quite numbered and they smartly do not join the ranks of the Taliban.



It's not the matter which kind of weapons Taliban using, it's a matter how they are fighting, Taliban are using the best tactic which is religion as most Afghans whom control by Taliban are illiterate as we in Afghanistan saying don't be afraid of someone who has the library but be scare from someone who believe a book, my point is, the modern weapons do not cure the problems and it will never win the war. However, as an Afghan my request is from the west particularly from USA if you kill the Afghans they will kill you, if you help them to built the country they will always be grateful from you.


In the five years I filmed "Camp Victory, Afghanistan"( a documentary about the training of the ANA) I watched the range training evolve.
Eye problems are rampant among the young and the old.
What I noticed as a teacher and a civilian is that our set of carefully evolved and measurable metrics for the soldierly skills, from push ups to qualifying at the range, did not completely translate. The capacity for the ANA to fulfill those metrics really depended on who was doing the counting. The systems that support that kind of teaching (everything from attendance to sighting a weapon one day and using the same one the next) were not always functioning.
However, the Afghans I followed were geniuses at the work-around, (as long as safety was not a concern...) This ability would pop up in the strangest places and accomplish the craziest things.
What I gather from your wonderful article is that the Taliban utilize that skill more effectively then we can.



I'll make three more points, then quit:

First, the shooters in Helmand are not necessarily representative of Taliban marksmanship elsewhere. The one time I was personally the target of a Taliban rifleman, I was in the passenger seat of a Humvee going 30 MPH in a wide defile near the Pakistan non-border. The shooter must have been at least 200 yards distant with an elevation of some 50 meters, and he put a single round into the bullet-proof window of the up-armored Humvee about 4 inches in front of my nose. (If you could upload photos here, I'd post a picture of it I took at the end of the day as a memento.)

Second, I qualified (barely) as a Marksman with the old M-16A1 on a Marine Corps range in the 1980's, and have fired a captured AK at a range in Afghanistan. The thing was so sloppy the bolt actually rattled inside the receiver, and I couldn't hit a Sprite can at 100 yards. I doubt many Marines -- who could hit targets easily at 150-200 yards with an M-4 -- could hit much at that range with an AK47 knock-off, they are so poorly made. And thank God for that.

But, third, and most importantly, the purpose of most of this Taliban fire is harrassment, not to inflict casualties, like old "Washing Machine Charlie," the Japanese biplane pilot who buzzed Marine lines every night on Guadalcanal. In Helmand, an illiterate (and expendable) teenage Taliban shooter snaps off a couple rounds at a Marine patrol, and they immediately stop whatever they were intending to do that day (talk to elders, build rapport with the people, work on a school, win hearts and minds), and spend the rest of the patrol shooting back and chasing him: Taliban Mission Accomplished.



Great article on how to train our enemy to become better shots. You people are garbage.



I found the article excellent. My own fighting bacground is Vietmam with time as a aircraft controller putting in bomb strikes. I have also been a marksmanship insturctor with small arms. I have traveled extensively throughout the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. I believe that todays military has to be trained in the use of multiple small arms. This is because the terrain and nature of the area in which you are fighting dictates what will be the most suitable small arm for troops to use. In jungle and scrub jungle such as Viet Nam, weapons such as the AK 47 and M-16 with their limited effective combat range of 300 yards are good choices, In more open terrain such as is being encountered fighting the Taliban in Afiganistan, longer range weapons such as the M-14, the M-1 will be more effective. Thus our troops must be trained and equipped to use multiple types of small arms, in order to be effective and inflict maximum casualties on the enemy and minimize casualties on our side.

I would also like to point out that given the type of "hit and run" tactics the enemy uses, one frequently must reliy on ones own organic weapons to counter the attack. By the time artilliery fire or air strikes are requested, approved (often a very slow process) and delivered, the enemy is frequently long gone from the scene. Many times I have controlled air strikes which were needed at the time thery were requested, but by the time they arrived only empty jungle was being bombed. Heavy artilley and airstriles are moste effective only when they can be deliverd within 5 minures of the initial request, unless one is involved in a static siege type situation, where the enemy is stupid enough to stay in the same location for an extended period of time.

The tactic of mineing the cover at the point of an ambush is very old. I remember being taught it in the early 60ies and it was certainly not new then. The counters to it are also known, and I assume are being employed by our troops.



A fine article from someone who obviously served in the military, and so indicates in the story. I had never thought of poor eyesight as a problem for the Taliban, but it's so true. Even with good first-world eye glasses, I am still a mediocre marksman. There are other factors too, lack of time at the range, etc., but my eyes have betrayed me in any sport, and shooting is one of them.


I guess we are lucky that there's no one with a real intelligence service on their side. These guys are excellent material and could be whipped into shape relatively easily.



Body Armor. If you feel more protected while exposed, you will take more time to line up the shot.

Long range firepower: Taliban always have to worry about the longer range US firepower, even in a close firefight. Again, they will be more nervous about exposure.

Medical attention: A seriously wounded Taliban is likely a dead Taliban. A seriously wounded American has a good chance to survive.

Courage + Training: The Taliban seem to have courage, but training teaches you what to do with your courage.



MPC, go back and read comment 47. The primary purpose of Taliban gunfire is not to inflict casualties. That is the purpose of IEDs. The purpose of firing a few rounds in our general direction is to make US forces spend all their time chasing a few infinitely-replaceable and illiterate teenage boys with guns around the countryside instead of winning the war by focusing on the population. The Taliban are not fools; they have read their Vietnam history, too, and they know exactly what US troops in contact will do. Their gunfire is achieving EXACTLY what they want it to do -- distracting US forces from a winning strategiy (helping the people) to a losing strategy (attrition). Are we're like the Washington Generals playing the Harlem Globetrotters -- we fall for the same trick every time.



Sirs,
I wanted to thank you writing such a powerful lesson as to why more of our brave Marines are not dying. As a father of a Marine, one who's taken an oath to defend this country, and those in it (which, by the way, includes your author), I've spent many sleepness days and nights worrying and praying for the safety of my son and his brothers.
It is mind boglying as to why you, the New York TImes, would find it so important to point out the deficiences of our enemies' training, if not to elicit sympothy for them. Since we are at war, one could argue that a charge of Treason should be in order.
But better yet, since the Taliban are such poor marksmen, why don't your staff and the writer take a leap of courage and lead the next mission into enemy quarters. You shouldn't have to worry - the enemy is such bad shots......



You people who are criticizing the NYT for publishing this information are retards. Is it really possible there are Americans out there who are so utterly totally stupid that they actually think there is one iota of information in this article the Taliban don't already know? No wonder we're losing. Just like in Vietnam, Americans are once again completely underestimating the enemy. We lost in Vietnam because we thought the enemy was "just a bunch of dumb gooks." Now we're losing in Afghanistan because Americans obviously believe we're up against "just a bunch of dumb ragheads." Anybody who hasn't seen the movie "Idiocracy" should watch it. it was soooo right.



The author along with a NYT photographer was embedded with Kilo Company which was first into Marja via helicopter and which fought alone until the battalion's other two companies joined-up on them. Those two companies had come overland exposing themselves to routes peppered with IEDs. These NYT employees allowed us to "see" the courage and professionalism of our Marines. To get the context of the "At War" blog, you have to read the Times. Thank heavens the Taliban cannot easily remedy the cultural and physical reasons their followers spray and pray. Our Army troops will likely face a different situation in Kandahar and we will learn of this through NYT employees and TV video supplied by reporters whose only weapons are their eyes and keyboards. The quality of the emails to the "At War" blog has been extraordinary, but those who attack the reporter's motivation have just not read the full coverage of the move into Marja. Moreover, Internet or no, you just don't understand how far away this war is both in distance and environment. The Taliban fighters are too far down the information and food chain to benefit from our critique of their performance. They have adapted their tactics to their limitations and will continue to adapt. Our troops will adapt as well. Neither side will gain their tactical insights from newspapers or TV. To our troops, "Drive on!"



My take from this article is that Taliban marksmanship suffers from multiple, structural defects that cannot be easily remedied - short of an immediate, massive infusion of Chechen fighters who bring in their own guns and ammo, that is. Lousy logistical support, lousy weapons firing training, lousy weapons and lousy eyesight - what a combo. For the foreseeable future, Taliban fire should be accurate - in giving away the positions of its shooters, that is.



MarineReconDad,

If you read my posts on this article, you will see that I not only am a veteran, I served in Afghanistan where I was rocketed, IED'd, mortared and shot at. In Vietnam, as in Afghanistan, the military HAS dictated how the war was fought, with disastrous consequences in both cases. In Vietnam, William Westmoreland, possibly the worst 4-star general in American history, insisted on an idiotic war of attrition against insurgents who ran circles aroound him and easily replaced losses. His stupidity cost the lives of about 40,000 Americans. (The rest are on the consciences of Nixon, Kissinger and Creighton Abrams). The exact same thing is true of Afghanistan, where a succession of braindead generals, including McNeil, Eickenberry, Barno and McKiernan, did the exact same thing for eight years -- fought a war of attrition instead of protecting the people, the basic tenet of counterinsurgency. I urge you to read the article: "Refighting the Last War: Afhanistan and the Vietnam Template" in the November 2009 issue of the Army's thinktank magazine, Military Review. You will find this online easily and free of charge with a quick Google search.

And by the way, I wore the same gold Airborne wings your son wears, and with pride.